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Public pension wealthIn January 2006, the Dutch government implemented a pension reform that substantially reduced the
public pension wealth of workers born in 1950 or later. At the same time, a tax-facilitated savings plan
was introduced that implied a large savings subsidy for all workers, irrespective of birth year. This paper
uses linked administrative and survey data to assess the effect of the reform on the savings and retire-
ment expectations and realizations of two virtually identical male cohorts that differ only in treatment
status, the treated having been born in 1950 and the controls having been born in 1949. We show that
retirement expectations are in line with realizations and that the reform increased the labor supply for
the larger part of the workers, namely, those without sufficient means to substantially increase private
savings to counter the effect of the reform. These workers have zero substitution rates between private
and public wealth. On the other hand, there is a group of mostly high-wage workers who participate in
the tax-facilitated savings plan and increase their private savings to fully counter the impact of the drop
in public wealth. An unintended side effect of the introduction of the tax-facilitated savings plan is that
high-wage earners who are not affected by the drop in pension wealth retire even sooner than initially
planned.
 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Most industrialized countries have sophisticated pension sys-
tems that provide substantial pension benefits after retirement.
These benefits have important effects on employees’ intertemporal
work and savings choices. Due to population aging and declining
fertility rates, many of these countries have started to implement
major pension reforms aimed at increasing the labor supply of
older workers. Whether and to what extent individuals adjust theirretirement and savings plans in response to changes in public pen-
sion wealth (PPW) is important. Is private wealth a good substitute
for the mandatory buildup of public pensions? And how does this
interact with labor supply choices?
This paper looks at the effect of a large permanent change in
pension wealth on the private savings decisions and retirement
expectations and realizations of Dutch public sector workers born
in 1949 and 1950. As of January 2006, the pension rights of those
born in 1950 (or later) were substantially reduced, while the pen-
sion rights of those born in 1949 (or earlier) were unaffected. The
1949 cohort could retire at age 62 years and three months at 70% of
their gross wages. For the 1950 cohort, the gross replacement rate
dropped to 64% if they wanted to retire at age 62 years and three
months, or they had to work an additional 13 months to obtain
the 70% rate of their slightly older counterparts.
At the same time as the pension reform, the Dutch government
introduced the so-called Life Course Savings Scheme (LCS), or
Levensloopregeling, a tax-facilitated savings program that permits
tax-free savings of up to 12% of annual earnings in a fund that
can be used to finance periods of nonemployment, such as a sab-
batical or early retirement. The LCS enables all workers (those
affected by the pension reform and not) to privately save at lower
costs.
M. Lindeboom and R. Montizaan Journal of Public Economics 192 (2020) 104297We use linked administrative and survey data over the period
2007–2014 in which we observe the pension rights, individual
retirement expectations, decisions to participate in savings pro-
grams, and actual retirement choices of public sector workers born
in 1949 and 1950. This setup enables us to apply a sharp regression
discontinuity design (RDD) to measure the short-run response (one
year after the implementation of the reform) and the longer-run
response (up to eight years after the reform).
Our paper relates to the literature on the effects of Social Secu-
rity and pension on the labor supply and earnings of older workers
(e.g., Krueger and Pischke, 1992; Borsch-Supan, 2000; Coile and
Gruber, 2007; Mastrobuoni, 2009; Blau and Goodstein, 2010;
Gelber et al., 2016; Fetter and Lockwood, 2018). These studies
show that (changes in) the incentive structure of these programs
can have important effects on retirement timing and earnings.
There is a somewhat smaller literature on the effect of the financial
crisis on the wealth and retirement of older workers. Gustman
et al. (2012) find moderate effects on wealth and labor supply.
Goda et al. (2011) and Munnel and Rutledge (2013) find that the
crisis induced changes in retirement planning, with stronger
effects for individuals who experienced larger economic changes
(Goda et al., 2011). McFall (2011) shows that the crises extended
the working life of those with private pension wealth by
2.5 months.
Our paper is also of direct relevance to the literature on the sub-
stitution between PPW and private savings. Reasoning along the
lines of the standard life cycle model, PPW will affect the accumu-
lation of other forms of private savings. In a more general life cycle
model, retirement is endogenous and the effect of changes in PPW
on private savings is ambiguous (Feldstein, 1974; Feldstein and
Pellechio, 1979). Moreover, the rate of substitution between pri-
vate and PPW depends on a range of factors, such as tax incentives,
the relative rate of return to private assets, financial literacy, liq-
uidity constraints, and individual information about pensions
(Bottazzi et al., 2006; Alessie et al., 2013). Therefore, the degree
of substitution between private and public savings in practice
has been the subject of many empirically oriented papers.
It has been found that private wealth and PPW are not perfect
substitutes (e.g., Feldstein, 1974; Feldstein and Pellechio, 1979;
Gale, 1998; Bernheim, 2002; Engelgardt and Kumar, 2011; Chetty
et al., 2014; see also the literature reviewed in Alessie et al.,
2013). Attanasio and Bruggiavini (2003) and Attanasio and
Rohwedder (2003) argue that the measured effect depends on
when in the life cycle the individual experiences the reform, but
also when the individual is observed by the researcher relative to
the reform. Therefore the degree of substitution between private
and public pension wealth may vary with age.
Evidence based on analyses that consider both savings and
retirement responses to pension reforms is scarce. An exception
is the paper by Bottazzi et al. (2006). The authors exploit a series
of pension reforms that took place in Italy between 1992 and
1997 to estimate their effects on households’ retirement expecta-
tions and private wealth accumulation. In their analyses, the
authors compare the pre-reform behavior of cohorts of private sec-
tor workers, public sector workers, and self-employed individuals
with post-reform behavior. Their findings indicate that workers
revised their retirement expectations in accordance with the
incentives of the reforms, and those who are better informed about
future benefits have higher rates of substitution between public
and private pension wealth.
As Bottazzi et al. (2006), we look at the effect of a reform on
retirement expectations and savings decisions. However, we differ
in some important ways. First, we isolate a single and clear reform
that led to a sharp discontinuity design; that is, the assignment
rule is clear and simple and implies a strong differential treatment
of workers born around January 1, 1950. Second, the two cohorts,2
one born in 1950 and the other in 1949, are homogeneous with
respect to observed characteristics and differ only in treatment sta-
tus. The cohorts are not subject to other policy reforms that could
differentially affect them and prior to the reform both cohorts had
identical expectations about the age of retirement. Bottazzi et al.
(2006) show that the effect of the reform critically depends on
how well the individuals are informed about the reform. We pro-
vide evidence that the 1950 cohort understood the consequences
of reform for their pension wealth. Third, we start observing both
cohorts just after the policy reform in 2007 and follow them up
to 2014. This implies that we estimate different elasticities. We
measure direct, short run effects, but also how the response
evolves as the cohort ages. Finally, we consider a cohort of workers
nearing retirement, a group of workers for whom changes in PPW
require a timely response and reforms can have potentially dra-
matic effects. Most, if not all, pension reforms in the developed
world include cohorts that are affected very late in the game. The
results of this study therefore provide important information for
policy makers about the effectiveness of reforms for such workers
as well as potentially unintended reform effects.
Our analyses show that the treatment group immediately
adjusts their retirement expectations by about 10.5 months. The
drop in pension wealth is equivalent to 13 months of earlier retire-
ment. The difference in expectations between the treated and
untreated cohorts remains stable in later years. Our results thus
imply that the average treated worker compensates for the drop
in pension rights mainly at the expense of leisure in retirement.
However, the savings rate (as measured by participation in the
LCS) of the 1950 cohort is more than twice the savings rate of
the controls. Participants for the control and treated cohorts,
respectively, in the LCS state that they expect to finance about
eight months and 13 months of earlier retirement. Actual retire-
ment observed eight years after the reform in 2014 are in strong
accordance with previously expressed retirement expectations.
Note, however, that these results apply to individuals who are
nearing retirement. Workers in our sample only had a few years
to adjust their savings to counter the retirement effects of the
reform. It is therefore conceivable that our findings may not hold
for younger workers or for reforms that are announced much in
advance.
Bearing this in mind, our findings show that individuals are for-
ward looking and that the reform increased the labor supply for the
larger part of the workers, especially for those without sufficient
means to substantially increase private savings to counter the
effect of the reform. These workers, who generally have lower
wages and education levels, thus have low substitution rates
between private and public wealth. On the other hand, there is a
group of mostly high-wage workers who are less affected by the
reform. They participate in the tax-facilitated LCS and are therefore
able to cushion the impact of the reform by private wealth. An
unintended side effect of the introduction of the tax-facilitated
savings plan is the decision of high-wage earners not affected by
the drop in pension wealth to retire sooner than initially planned.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Dutch
pension system and the 2006 reform of the public sector’s pension
system. Section 3 describes the data and variables. Section 4 pre-
sents the results of our empirical analyses. Finally, Section 5 sum-
marizes and discusses the implications of our findings.2. The Dutch pension system and the 2006 reform
2.1. The Dutch pension system
The Dutch pension system consists of three pillars. The first pil-
lar is the National Old Age Pension (AOW), which is the flat-rate
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idents of the Netherlands when they reach the statutory retire-
ment age (65 in 2006). The AOW is a pay-as-you-go system in
which current payments are financed by income taxes. The benefit
is related to the net minimum wage.
The second pillar consists of earning-related sectoral pension
plans. These pension schemes are predominantly of the defined
benefit type and fully funded. Sector pensions are negotiated
between unions and employer organizations at the sector or firm
level and are usually set forth in collective agreements. Participa-
tion is mandatory for individual workers, ensuring that each
worker is covered by the sector pension. The Dutch Pensions and
Savings Act dictates that the administration of the sector pension
schemes in the second pillar is delegated to pension funds to which
both employers and employees must contribute. The sector pen-
sion schemes allow workers to retire before the statutory retire-
ment age.
Until 2006, workers could retire before the mandatory retire-
ment age using the so-called pre-pension scheme (‘‘prepensioen
regeling”). Contributions to these sectoral pre-pension schemes
were tax deductible and amounted to 17.47% and 7.47% of gross
wages for employers and workers, respectively (Euwals et al.,
2006). Typically, contributions to the sector pension schemes were
such that, in 2006, a public sector employee who had served
40 years in the public sector could retire at the age of 62 and three
months at a gross replacement rate of 70% of average yearly earn-
ings since 2004. This includes an annuity financed from the pre-
pension contributions to bridge the three years before the com-
mencement of the first pillar AOW benefit at the statutory retire-
ment age (age 65). Consequently, early retirement was the social
norm in the Netherlands. Before 2006, approximately 80% of all
workers retired at the age of 62 or younger, and only 6% retired
at the age of 65 (Statistics Netherlands, 2009).
The third pillar consists of voluntarily built up savings supple-
mentary to the public and sector pensions. These are offered by
private insurance companies and typically yield annuity payments
at retirement age. Due to the well-established public and sector
pension systems, the third pillar is less well developed in the
Netherlands.12 The reform abolished the use of the annuity to bridge the gap between early
retirement and age 65 for cohorts born after 1949. However, premiums contributed
prior to December 31, 2005, remained exempt from taxation and were included in the
stock of pension wealth in the new pension scheme. The small premium increases
amounted to 0.4%, or €140 annually for the median worker.
3 This only holds for the first (1950) cohort. Later-born cohorts were subject to
larger cuts in PPW.
4 Employers are obliged to allow their employees to take a leave financed by the2.2. The 2006 reform of the pension system
In the Netherlands, as in other countries, there has been an
ongoing debate about the sustainability of the pension system
and the need for reform. As a consequence of this discussion, the
Dutch government replaced the pre-pension in the second pillar
with a new pension scheme called the ABP Flexible Pension
Scheme, administered by the public sector’s pension fund, Alge-
meen Burgelijk Pensioenfonds (ABP). The introduction of the new
pension scheme was announced in the summer of 2005 and
became effective on January 1, 2006, for workers born in 1950 or
later and for those born before 1950 who had not worked contin-
uously in the public sector since April 1, 1997. In light of the ongo-
ing discussion about the sustainability of the pension system, the
announcement of a reform was not entirely unexpected. What
was unexpected, however, was the speed at which the reform
was implemented, as well as the strong differential treatment of
workers born around January 1, 1950, which came as a surprise
when it was announced on July 5, 2005.
This new ABP Flexible Pension Scheme involves (i) a change in
eligibility ages for early pension benefits, with an increase to
60 years; (ii) stronger incentives to continue working; and (iii) a1 In 2007, it constituted only 5% of retirement income (Bovenberg and Gradus,
2015).
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small increase in pension contribution payments.2 Workers born
before 1950 remained entitled to the old, more generous early retire-
ment scheme if they had worked continuously in the public sector
since April 1, 1997. Such workers could thus retire between ages
55 and 70. Retirement at age 62 years and three months yields a
pension benefit with a gross replacement rate of 70% of average
yearly earnings since 2004 (€31,500 for the median worker). Due
to the reform, a typical employee born in 1950 or later with 40 years
of tenure obtains a gross replacement rate of 64% when retiring at
the age of 62 years and three months (€28,500 for the median
worker). To attain a replacement rate of 70%, these workers have
to postpone retirement by 13 months.3
In Appendix A, we provide details about the calculation of
replacement rates in the old and new system. Table A1 in Appendix
A presents the replacement rates by age and earnings quartiles.
The table shows that, at any age, the replacement rates in the
new system are lower than in the old system and that, in the
new system, the replacement rates at lower earnings are generally
higher than those at higher earnings. Taken together with differen-
tials in age-related mortality rates across earnings groups, this
leads to substantial differences in the present discounted value of
PPW across earnings groups.
Figs. 1a–1c plot PPW profiles for retirement at different ages for
low-earnings groups (Fig. 1a), median-earnings groups (Fig. 1b)
and high-earnings groups (Fig. 1c) in the old (black lines) and
new (gray lines) pension system. See Appendix A for details of
the PPW calculations. The figures show that differences in PPW
are substantial and are largest for higher-earnings groups. Specifi-
cally, at age 62, PPW differentials are €18,664, €35,209 and €65,209
for the bottom earnings quartile (€37,000), the median earnings
(€45,000) and the top earnings quartile (€60,000), respectively.
The figures also show that the PPW accrual rates are higher in
the new system, implying greater rewards to delayed retirement.
The PPW differential therefore decreases substantially at the statu-
tory retirement age, particularly for lower-earnings groups (€6299,
€12,510 and €39,781, for the bottom, median, and top quartile
earnings, respectively).
At the time of the pension reform in 2006, the Dutch govern-
ment also introduced the tax-facilitated savings program LCS, sim-
ilar to individual retirement accounts (IRAs) in the United States.
The LCS, open to all workers, irrespective of their year of birth, per-
mits tax-free savings of up to 12% of annual earnings in a fund that
can be used to finance periods of nonemployment, such as a sab-
batical or early retirement.4 The savings are collected from monthly
gross wages and held in accounts at insurance companies, banks, or
the subsidiary companies of pension funds. All workers are allowed
to save up to a maximum of 210% of their annual earnings in the
fund. Those born in the years 1950 through 1954 and who therefore
had less time to save 210% than younger cohorts are allowed to save
more than 12% of their annual earnings, as long as the cumulative
maximum does not exceed 210% of annual earnings.5
Besides the introduction of the ABP Flexible Pension Scheme, no
other institutional changes differentially affect the 1949 and 1950
cohorts in 2006. We can therefore apply a sharp regression discon-LCS.
5 Note that workers in the 1950 cohort must make substantial savings (16% of their
annual earnings for six years) to finance early retirement at age 62 (rather than
retirement at age 63 and one month).
Fig. 1a. Present discounted value of public pension wealth (PPW) by retirement age
(for people on the 25 percentile of the earnings distribution). The Present
Discounted value of Public Pension Wealth for an individual aged S in 2006 who
plans to retire at age R: PPWRS ¼
PT
t¼RB
R
t  atdtS 
PR1
t¼S c  Yt  at  dtS , where a is the
conditional survival rate, c the pension contribution rate and d a 2% discount factor.
Fig. 1b. Present Discounted Value of Public Pension Wealth (PPW) by retirement
age (for people with median earnings). The Present Discounted value of Public
Pension Wealth for an individual aged S in 2006 who plans to retire at age R:
PPWRS ¼
PT
t¼RB
R
t  atdtS 
PR1
t¼S c  Yt  at  dtS , where a is the conditional survival
rate, c the pension contribution rate and d a 2% discount factor.
Fig. 1c. Present discounted value of public pension wealth (PPW) by retirement age
(for people on the 75 percentile of the earnings distribution). The Present
Discounted value of Public Pension Wealth for an individual aged S in 2006 who
plans to retire at age R: PPWRS ¼
PT
t¼RB
R
t  atdtS 
PR1
t¼S c  Yt  at  dtS , where a is the
conditional survival rate, c the pension contribution rate and d a 2% discount factor.
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tinuity design (RDD). For the internal validity of our research
design, it is crucial that the workers born in 1950 be aware of
the consequences of the new pension system for their individual
situation. After the announcement of the reform in the summer
of 2005, the pension fund ABP launched a massive campaign to
inform its clients about the new pension and LCS and explain its
financial implications. In a special newsletter, unions, employer
organizations, and the ABP jointly explained the ABP Flexible Pen-
sion Scheme. Furthermore, all 1.2 million ABP members and their
employers received a personalized letter about the core character-
istics of the new scheme, along with a complete electronic service
package. Therefore, one can assume that, on January 1, 2006, most
public sector employees born after 1949 and their employers were
made aware of the changes in their pension rights. Of course, this
must be verified empirically, which we do in Section 3.4.
2.3. Behavioral responses to the policy reform
The reform implied a permanent change in the pension wealth
of workers born in 1950. The LCS further implied a subsidy on sav-
ings equal to the marginal tax rate. Starting with the behavioral
response to the latter, the implied savings subsidy of the LCS for
the median worker with an annual salary of €45,000, investing,
say, 12% of his salary (€5400) equals €2268. At a higher marginal
tax bracket (52% for gross earnings exceeding €54,000), this sub-
sidy could be substantially higher in absolute terms. These tax
advantages could induce additional savings and/or could divert
savings from other investment accounts to the LCS account. This
LCS is therefore expected to unambiguously increase savings in
this program for workers who are not financially constrained.
Increased private savings can alter the lifetime budget constraint
and, therefore, also influence retirement decisions. In this context,
this means that the 1949 cohort could use the additional private
savings to retire earlier. The 1950 cohort could use increased pri-
vate savings to (partly) counter the effects of the drop in PPW.
In the extended life cycle model (Feldstein, 1974; Feldstein and
Pellechio, 1979), retirement is endogenous and jointly determined
with savings decisions. This also applies here. The reform implied a
substantive drop in PPW, and PPW accrual rates are higher in the
new scheme (see Figs. 1a–1c). Moreover, in the new system, the
minimum eligibility age is 60. Therefore, for those affected by
the reform who initially (i.e., in the old system) planned to retire
before age 60 and who want to stick to that plan, increasing private
savings is the only option. For others, the substantive drop in PPW
and higher PPW accrual rates incentivize workers to postpone
retirement and/or increase private savings. Note, however, that
Figs. 1a–1c also show that the gap in PPW between the old and
new systems decreases at the statutory retirement age. Therefore,
the savings and retirement timing effect could be smaller for work-
ers who, prior to the reform, intended to retire at or after the statu-
tory retirement age.
In sum, the LCS will unambiguously increase savings in this pro-
gram for workers who are not financially constrained, and possibly
total savings. Increased private savings alter individuals’ lifetime
budget constraint and can therefore also influence retirement deci-
sions. Those born in 1949 could use the additional savings to
finance retirement earlier than initially planned, while the 1950
cohort could also use it to (partly) counter the effects of the drop
in pension wealth. Regarding the pension reform, the drop in
PPW holds for all ages and is accompanied by stronger incentives
to postpone retirement. Additional savings are likely to take place
via the LCS, since this program comes with a large savings subsidy.
It is a challenge to empirically separate the effects of the drop in
pension wealth and the introduction of the LCS on savings and
retirement decisions. We address this issue in Sections 4.1 (empir-
ical model) and 4.2 (results).
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3.1. Data collection
The Dutch pension fund ABP allowed us access to the adminis-
trative data of workers born in 1949 and 1950. The administrative
data were available from 2006 until 2014 and contain detailed
information on individuals’ accrued pension rights at ABP, retire-
ment status, pension benefits, annual wage, number of contractual
working hours, tenure in the public sector, and employment sub-
sector. For the analyses, we restrict ourselves to men and link them
to the survey data.6 These data sources have also been used in
Montizaan et al., 2010, 2015; Montizaan and Vendrik, 2014.
The panel survey started one year after the reform in 2007 and
was repeated annually until 2012. For reasons that will become
clear later, we only use the data from 2007 to 2011. The data of
the first wave were gathered in two stages. In January 2007, we
invited all 27,719 male public sector workers born in 1949 or
1950 to participate in our Internet survey and requested their e-
mail address. The invitation letter, sent by surface mail, included
general information but did not disclose information about the
research question or the research strategy, nor did we inform
potential participants that the invitation was sent only to public
sector employees born in 1949 and 1950. The letter also explicitly
assured confidentiality. In the second stage, the 11,458 workers
who sent their e-mail address received, in March 2007, an e-mail
with a link to the survey. Again, references to the nature of our
research question and research strategy were carefully avoided.
In total, 8516 individuals completed the questionnaire in 2007.
The response rates of the two birth cohorts were virtually identical,
30.5% and 31.0% for the treated and controls, respectively (see also
De Grip et al., 2012, who use the same data). Our analyses are
restricted to full-time employees who worked continuously in
the public sector since 1997 until 2006, and not in strenuous jobs
(e.g., firefighters, police officers).7 The worker’s age is the only crite-
rion that determines whether he is eligible for the (new) restricted
or the (old) more generous retirement scheme. After these selec-
tions, the final sample in 2007 consists of 6702 men, of whom
3468 were born in 1950 and 3234 in 1949.
The survey was repeated in March of every year. The responses
numbered 4142 in 2008, 6048 in 2009, 5600 in 2010, and 4020 in
2011.8 We extensively check for differential survey participation
patterns between the treated and control cohorts. The results of
these checks are presented in Tables B1–B4 in Appendix B. These
tables show that selection into the survey and subsequent attrition
rates do not vary with treatment status, that the characteristics of
those lost to attrition in subsequent waves do not differ from those
who remained in the survey, and, importantly, that the effect of the
reform on retirement expectations in 2007 was not affected by sam-
ple attrition (see Table B4 in Appendix B). We will return to the
effect of sample attrition on longer-run outcomes in the sensitivity
analyses.3.2. Measuring retirement expectations and private savings behavior
Our main interest lies in investigating how the change in the
pension system and the introduction of the LCS affect retirement
expectations, saving decisions, and ultimately retirement realiza-
tions. To elicit retirement expectations before the reform took6 We focus on male employees because, in the Netherlands, only a small, selective
fraction of women are still working in this birth cohort, at age 57 or 58.
7 Firefighters and ambulance and police personnel have other retirement schemes.
8 The increase in the number of responses in 2009 is due to a renewed invitation to
participate in the Internet survey. This invitation was sent to counter the substantive
panel attrition in the second wave.
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place, we asked respondents in 2007 the following survey ques-
tion: ‘‘At what age did you expect to retire five years ago?” To mea-
sure the development in retirement preferences and expectations
after the reform, we annually asked these two questions: (1) ‘‘At
what age do you expect to definitively stop working?” and (2)
‘‘What would your pension benefit be as a percentage of your net
wage if you retire at age 62?”
There is an extensive literature on retirement expectations, and
the general consensus seems to be that retirement expectations
measured in this way accurately match realizations (Bernheim,
1989, 2009; Dwyer and Hu, 2000; Chan and Stevens, 2004;
Benítez-Silva and Dwyer, 2005). In this paper, we observe expecta-
tions for five years, as well as retirement realizations until 2014.
We can therefore examine, besides behavioral responses to the
policy reform, how well expectations match retirement
realizations.
Our survey annually includes several questions on pension sav-
ings. The survey includes a question on whether the respondent
participates in the LCS. Those who do are also asked how many
months of earlier retirement they plan to finance out of this LCS.
Unfortunately, this question was asked only in the 2009 wave.
The survey also asks whether respondents made additional savings
arrangements for their pension in the past year and how many
alternative sources of (pension) wealth they have. These alterna-
tive pension products include (1) pensions built up at pension
funds other than ABP, (2) life annuities, (3) life insurance, (4) sav-
ings in excess of €15,000, (5) investments, (6) inheritance, and (7)
other pension insurance products. Moreover, the survey asks
whether the respondent has a partner with his or her own income
or pension and whether workers have positive net housing wealth
(the value of the house minus the mortgage).
3.3. Descriptive analyses: Comparing the treated and control cohorts
Since our empirical analyses exploit the sharp discontinuity in
pension treatment induced by the natural experiment, it is of cru-
cial importance for the internal validity of our design that (1) the
individuals in the treatment and control groups are sufficiently
similar, (2) the reform was well understood and actually created
a sharp discontinuity in expectations and savings, and (3) that
the observed characteristics did not discontinuously change across
the threshold.
First, as already mentioned, although attrition was substantial,
the survey participation rates of both cohorts are very similar for
each year of the panel survey, and there is no (differential) drop
in the number of observations near the threshold. Second, Table 1
shows descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups
for the 2007 wave. While the first two columns show the respec-
tive means, the last column gives the p-value of the coefficient of
an RDD regression for a specific covariate, while correcting for
the birth date (in days). Fig. C2 in Appendix C plots the average
of the covariates for the treated and control cohorts around the
cutoff. The table and figure both confirm that the cohorts are sim-
ilar in characteristics and that the covariates evolve smoothly
across the cutoff. We also perform this test for the subsequent
years, 2008–2011, and find no significant differences in observ-
ables between the two cohorts (results available upon request).
Concerning personal characteristics, we observe that approxi-
mately 67% of public sector workers are highly educated, 90% are
married, and they are, on average, in good health. The overrepre-
sentation of highly educated workers in the public sector is con-
firmed in other (Dutch) data sets. Most respondents are
employed in the government (47%) and education (41%) sectors
and work full-time.
Among the set of wealth variables, one is significantly different
at conventional levels between the control and treatment groups:
Table 1
Characteristics for affected and unaffected respondents (2007).
Affected by the reform Not affected by the reform Min Max p-Value1
Personal characteristics
Low education level 0.132 0.125 0 1 0.859
High education level 0.671 0.681 0 1 0.518
Married 0.904 0.919 0 1 0.683
Number of sick days 9.47 8.89 0 250 0.741
Job characteristics
# years contributed to pension fund 30.262 31.762 10 45.579 0.746
Log wage 10.788 10.801 9.69 12.89 0.563
Number of contractual work hours 0.996 0.996 0.26 1.25 0.977
Sectors
Government 0.481 0.452 0 1 0.763
Education 0.446 0.479 0 1 0.612
Privatized 0.073 0.069 0 1 0.689
Income and savings
Life course savings (LCS) 0.155 0.064 0 1 0.000
Extra pension savings in previous year 0.254 0.210 0 1 0.197
Partner with own income 0.749 0.728 0 1 0.150
Partner with own pension 0.571 0.572 0 1 0.820
Positive net housing wealth 0.687 0.684 0 1 0.267
Number of alternative wealth sources 2.365 2.359 0 9 0.719
Retirement expectations
Expected retirement benefit 66.725 72.272 30 135 0.000
Expected retirement age 63.472 62.734 57 70 0.000
Expected retirement age before
reform
61.390 61.489 53 70 0.630
1 The last column reports the p-values for the treatment dummy from an RD regression of the variable in question.
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the tax-facilitated LCS. Only 6.4% of the 1949 cohort participated
in this LCS, whereas this fraction for the 1950 cohort is more than
twice as high (about 15.5%). Because this program was introduced
at the same time as the pension reform, the participation rates in
the LCS for the treated cohort could be seen as a direct response
to the savings subsidy plus the drop in PPW. For the controls, par-
ticipation in LCS reflects the direct response to the savings subsidy.
Note that the savings subsidy could also indirectly affect retire-
ment choices (see Section 2.3).Fig. 2. Expected retirement benefit in 2007. This Figure presents the mean expected
pension benefit at age 62 as a percentage of The figure presents the (Epanechnikov)
kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of the expected retirement benefit (for two
successive birth months). The vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control
and treatment groups. The confidence intervals are at the 95% level.3.4. The respondents understood the consequences of the reform
As mentioned at the end of Section 2, the consequences of the
reform were communicated extensively to the affected cohorts.
Moreover, all employees receive annually a detailed overview of
their pension rights that shows them exactly the pension benefits
they would receive if they were to retire at different ages. The sam-
ple means in Table 1 show that respondents born in 1949 expected
a net replacement rate of 72% if they retired at age 62, compared to
65% for respondents born in 1950. Fig. 2 depicts this graphically,
with each dot representing the average expected pension benefit
for individuals born in a specific birth month. The figure confirms
that the respondents understood the consequences of the reform
and that there is a strong discontinuity at the threshold date. We
find a similar pattern for later years (see Fig. C1 of Appendix C).
The sample means of the question on the expected retirement
age five years ago (measured in 2007) do not differ between the
treated and control cohorts. Fig. 3 also shows the lack of a clear
break around the threshold. This is confirmed in Table C1 of
Appendix C.9 Things look very different for the expected retirement
age one year after the reform: those born in 1949 expected, on aver-
age, to retire at age 62 years and eight months, while those born in
1950 expected to retire at age 63 years and six months, and there is a9 A Kolmogorov–Smirnov test of the equality of the distribution functions indicates
no significant differences between the cohorts (results available upon request).
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clear discontinuity at the cutoff (see Fig. 4). Expectations can change
over time. We examine longer-run changes in Section 4.3.4. Empirical implementation and results
4.1. Empirical implementation
The LCS affected both the 1949 and 1950 cohorts and, reasoning
along the lines of the extended life cycle model (Feldstein, 1974),
we argue that this savings program unambiguously increased pri-
vate savings in the program and could lead workers to divert sav-
ings from other accounts to LCS accounts. Additional private
savings alter the lifetime budget constraint and could lead to ear-
lier retirement. The 2006 pension reform affected only the 1950
Fig. 3. Expected retirement age before the reform. This figure presents the
(Epanechnikov) kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of the expected retirement
age in 2002 (retrospectively measured in 2007). The vertical line marks the
threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. The confidence intervals are at
the 95% level.
Fig. 4. Expected retirement age one year after the reform (2007). The figure
presents the (Epanechnikov) kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of the
expected retirement age in 2007 (for two successive birth months). The vertical
line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. The confidence
intervals are at the 95% level.
10 We only observe whether an individual has saved in various ways, and not the
actual amount of savings (see Section 3).
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minimum eligibility age by five years, and changes in PPW accrual
rates (cf. Figs. 1a–1c). This could induce workers born in 1950 to
delay retirement and increase private savings.
Given the differential treatment of the two cohorts on January
1, 2006, it is most natural to specify quasi-reduced form Regression
Discontinuity (RDD) equations for retirement expectations and
savings. More specifically, for changes in retirement expectations
ERit  ERi2002, we specify
ERit  ERi2002 ¼ a0 þ a1Ii 1950ð Þ þ a2Ii 1950ð ÞBi þ a3Bi þ a4Xit
þ it ð1Þ
Similarly, for savings S, we write
Sit ¼ b0 þ b1Ii 1950ð Þ þ b2Ii 1950ð ÞBi þ b3Bi þ b4Xit þ it ð2Þ
where ERit is the expected retirement age in year t, t = 2007, . . .,
2011. For S, we distinguish whether an individual participated in
the LCS and whether they made (other) additional savings in the7
past years to supplement their pension.10 The variable I(1950) is
an indicator for the 1950 cohort, B denotes the running variable birth
date (expressed in days, normalized to zero on December 31, 1949,
and divided by 100), and X is a set of observed individual character-
istics, some of which are from the survey and some from the admin-
istrative database.
The coefficient a1 measures the reduced-form treatment effect
on retirement expectations. This treatment effect is the compound
effect of the direct effect of the change in pension wealth on the
labor supply and the indirect savings effect. In turn, this indirect
savings effect consists of an effect caused by the drop in pension
wealth plus an effect caused by the subsidy on savings due to
the introduction of the LCS. Note that the LCS also affected the con-
trol cohort born in 1949. The large savings subsidy could affect
their private savings decisions and, therefore, also the budget con-
straint. This, in turn, could also affect the retirement decisions of
the 1949 cohort. Consequently, the parameter a1 measures the
changes in retirement expectations of the treated, over and above
the changes in the retirement expectations of the controls. Simi-
larly, the parameter b1 measures the additional effect for the trea-
ted (1950) cohort and depends on the savings response to the drop
in PPW and the savings subsidy.
The variables S and dER are jointly determined and, therefore,
besides our (single) instrument, more information is required to
tease out the direct and indirect effects contained in a1 and b1. For-
tunately, the 2009 survey also contains a question about the num-
ber of months the participants in the LCS expected to finance from
this program. With this question we can separate savings effects
induced by the drop in pension wealth and the effect of the savings
subsidy. This, however, requires additional assumptions that we
make explicit in Section 4.2.2.
4.2. Short-run effects of the reform
4.2.1. Retirement expectations one year after the reform
The first two columns of Table 2 provide the ordinary least
squares (OLS) results of Eq. (1) for 2007. The treatment dummy
refers to the average treatment effect of the drop in PPW and the
introduction of the LCS for the cohort born in 1950. From a com-
parison between Columns (1) and (2), one can conclude that add-
ing controls does not alter the parameter estimate of interest,
confirming that the treatment and control groups are very similar.
Table 1 shows that, in 2002, the retirement expectations were vir-
tually identical for the two cohorts. We therefore also include the
results of a regression with the left-hand side of (1) replaced by
retirement expectations in 2007 (Columns (3) and (4)). As
expected, the treatment effect is very similar in both specifications.
The coefficient of interest (a1) indicates that, in the short run,
workers affected by the reform expect to work 0.88 years (about
10.5 months) longer. Since the drop in PPW is equivalent to
13 months of earlier retirement, our results imply that the average
treated worker compensates for the drop in PPW mainly at the
expense of leisure in retirement. Note once more that this total
average treatment effect on the treated consists of two forces:
the adjustment in retirement years (direct effect) and a savings
effect (indirect effect).
The regression results in Column (2) of Table 2 also show that
the change in retirement expectations is smaller for the higher
educated and those with higher earnings.
4.2.2. Savings one year after the reform
Table 3 provides the results for two of our savings measures
that we expect to be responsive to the reform: whether individuals
Table 2
Expected age of retirement in 2007 and the difference between the expected ages of retirement in 2007 and 2002: OLS results.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: ER(2007)–ER(2002)
Change in retirement expectations
ER(2007)
Expected retirement age 2007
Treatment dummy 0.841*** 0.875*** 0.812*** 0.810***
(0.102) (0.102) (0.081) (0.080)
Birth date/100 0.560* 0.543 0.053 0.073
(0.339) (0.339) (0.262) (0.258)
Birth date/100 * Treatment dummy 1.188** 1.166** 0.300 0.390
(0.480) (0.479) (0.387) (0.383)
Married 0.264*** 0.056
(0.097) (0.079)
Low educated 0.016 0.230***
(0.102) (0.077)
High educated 0.204** 0.064
(0.086) (0.068)
Wage (ln) 0.387*** 0.124
(0.124) (0.103)
Number of contribution years to the pension fund 0.028*** 0.052***
(0.005) (0.004)
Constant 1.358*** 4.685*** 62.724*** 63.031***
(0.073) (1.323) (0.056) (1.100)
Observations 6605 6476 6702 6569
Adjusted R2 0.041 0.062 0.046 0.093
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; other control variables include sector dummies, in Columns (2) and (4).
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 3
Savings in 2007: Results from a linear probability model.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Life course savings (LCS) Extra pension savings in previous
year
Treatment dummy 0.082*** 0.083*** 0.027 0.028
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021)
Birth date/100 0.017 0.016 0.062 0.046
(0.047) (0.047) (0.070) (0.070)
Birth date/100 * Treated dummy 0.019 0.009 0.029 0.038
(0.081) (0.080) (0.099) (0.098)
Married 0.016 0.022
(0.014) (0.018)
Low educated 0.004 0.061***
(0.013) (0.017)
High educated 0.018 0.019
(0.014) (0.017)
Wage (ln) 0.090*** 0.010
(0.022) (0.026)
Number of contribution years to the pension fund 0.003*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.067*** 0.842*** 0.222*** 0.397
(0.010) (0.229) (0.015) (0.271)
Observations 5245 5244 6645 6633
Adjusted R2 0.020 0.039 0.002 0.026
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; other control variables include sector dummies, in Columns (2) and (4).
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
11 Including wage in the regression increases the adjusted R-square with 9%.
Including the number of years an individual contributed to the public pension fund
increases the adjusted R-square with 2%.
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whether they had extra pension savings in the previous year (Col-
umns (3) and (4)). Fig. 5 gives a graphical representation. Columns
(1) and (2) indicate that the probability of participating in the LCS
is about eight percentage points higher for the treated cohort. This
effect is virtually unchanged when we add other regressors. Of
these other regressors, wages and the number of years an individ-
ual contributed to the public pension fund are the only significant
variables. Of the two variables the wage seems to be the most8
important one. A one standard deviation change in the logarithm
of wages is associated with a 2.5 percentage point change in the
probability to participate in the LCS.11 The wage effect could reflect
the ability to save. Of course, we cannot rule out that the plan is less
attractive for low-wage workers, because its tax advantage is
Fig. 5. Additional pension wealth (2007). The figures present the (Epanechnikov) kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of LCS participation and whether workers invested
in additional pension insurance in the previous year (for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. The
confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
14 We examined whether the characteristics of LCS participants and nonparticipants
are similar. Workers in the utility sector are slightly overrepresented in the control
group.
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that is, high-wage earners.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 show no significant treatment
effects on extra pension savings.12 This suggests that, for the trea-
ted, savings in the LCS are additional savings that are not at the
expense of savings in other accounts. About 6.4% of the 1949 cohort
participated in the LCS. For this cohort we also run a regression of
extra pension savings on participation in the LCS, to see if savings
in other pension savings account are crowded out by savings in
the LCS. We do not find a significant association. This result suggests
that savings in the LCS are additional private savings for the 1949
cohort as well. This finding contrasts with the results for IRAs in
the United States of Gale and Scholtz (1994), who find that changes
in the contribution limits of IRAs have a small or no net effect on
total savings.
A further look at the other coefficients in Column (4) reveals
that the effect of the number of years of contribution to the pen-
sion system has a sizable effect. This coefficient is more than three
times higher than in Column (2), which could suggest that the
number of years of contribution to the pension fund is likely to
reflect the need to save and that these savings already existed prior
to the reform.
In sum, the drop in pension wealth and the savings subsidy
increased total private savings, and this occurred primarily via
the LCS. Wages have a strong independent effect (irrespective of
treatment status) on the decision to participate in the LCS. The
number of years of contribution to the pension fund has indepen-
dent effects on both participation in the LCS and additional savings
to supplement pension income.
Recall that the pension reform and the LCS were introduced at
the same time, on January 1, 2006. The 1950 cohort was confronted
with both changes, whereas the controls were only affected by the12 We also looked at other forms of savings and find no treatment effects (results
available upon request).
13 There exists no control group for the introduction of the savings plan, so part of
the effect for the controls could be due to secular changes (e.g., expectations
regarding future reforms).
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introduction of the LCS. Changes in the private savings of the con-
trols are therefore a response to the savings subsidy,13 whereas
changes observed in the savings of the treated are, in addition,
affected by the loss in PPW.
For the LCS participants, the 2009 survey also included a ques-
tion about the number of months they planned to finance from this
savings account. Fig. 6 presents this graphically. The figure indi-
cates that those born in 1949 planned to finance an earlier retire-
ment by about eight months from their savings account. The
average for the affected (1950) cohort is about five months more.
This result is confirmed in Table 4. These five months may be inter-
preted as a pure substitution effect between private and public
pension wealth, that is, a pure crowding out effect of 38% due to
the drop in PPW. This, however, requires some strong assumptions.
First, that the controls serve as a good counterfactual for the
behavior of the treated.14,15 Second, that the effects of the LCS on
retirements and savings are additive with the effect of the reduction
in pension wealth. These assumptions have consequences for the
preference parameters in a life cycle model. More specifically, for
the two assumptions to hold we require intertemporal separable
lifetime utility; additive within period utility functions; a constant
elasticity of intertemporal substitution and a constant discount fac-
tor. We refer to Appendix E for more details. The figure also suggests
that treated workers participating in the LCS plan to fully counter the
effect of the reform on retirement (i.e. to counter the 13 months of
later retirement).16
Participation rates in the savings scheme differ for the treated
and control cohorts, and while the participating treated and con-15 Treated workers who were confronted with a drop in their pension wealth were
forced to rethink their retirement options and may have informed themselves better.
We used information on actual benefits from the pension fund and find that the
treated were slightly more accurate in predicting their actual pension benefit.
16 Wishful thinking may play a role here. If this is the case, then such optimistic
views of the treated who decide to participate in the LCS program are included in the
effect estimate in Table 4.
Fig. 6. Months of earlier retirement due to the Life course savings (LCS) (2009). The figure presents the (Epanechnikov) kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of the number
of months that workers expect to save in the LCS (for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. The
confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
Table 4
Months of early retirement financed from the LCS in 2009: OLS results.
(1) (2)
Dependent variable: Months of early
retirement financed
from the life course
savings program
Column 1 Column 2
Treatment dummy 4.796*** 5.008***
(1.790) (1.879)
Birth date/100 4.857 5.396
(7.533) (7.741)
Birth date/100 * Treatment dummy 7.826 6.958
(8.547) (8.841)
Married 0.876
(1.598)
Low educated 1.084
(1.716)
High educated 1.922
(1.206)
Wage (ln) 1.331
(1.529)
Number of contribution years to the pension fund 0.092
(0.081)
Constant 8.138*** 23.567
(1.575) (17.168)
Observations 601 589
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.047
The number of observations is lower, because in this table we focus only on workers
who participated in the LCS. Robust standard errors are in parentheses; other
control variables include sector dummies, in Column (2).
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
17 The marginal effect of participating in the LCS, based on the Tobit regression,
equals 0.111 (s.e. = 0.015).
18 See also the literature on the association between socioeconomic status and
health (e.g., Banks et al., 2006).
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ferential participation in the savings program could affect the
RDD estimate. We therefore also perform OLS and Tobit regres-
sions that include the zeros. OLS regressions based on the full10sample yield a coefficient of 2.02 (s.e. = 0.383). Tobit regressions
for the LCS participants yield a marginal effect of 2.74 months (s.
e. = 0.368). The results are available upon request.17
The results of Table 2 indicate that, on average, the treated work
about 10.5 months longer (0.875 * 12 = 10.5 months). Of the trea-
ted sample, about 16% of those who participated in the LCS
intended not to work 13 months longer (see Fig. 5) but, rather, to
stick to the previously set retirement age. This implies that the
treated who did not participate in the program, on average,
expected to work 10.5/0.84 = 12.5 months longer, that is, almost
the entire effect of the reform. Hence, it appears that these workers
are not willing or able to sacrifice future pension income or current
consumption to counter the drop in PPW.
The results of Table 3 indicate that wages are an important fac-
tor in explaining the decision to participate in the LCS. In light of
the above, this finding could imply that primarily lower-wage
workers are induced to postpone retirement. However, these
workers generally also have worse health.18 Indeed, a regression
of the logarithm of wages on sickness absence and a set of other con-
trols shows a significant negative association between wages and
sickness absence (results available upon request). This finding sug-
gests that financial constraints, rather than a low disutility of work,
are at play in the decision to postpone retirement.
4.3. Longer-run effects
4.3.1. Developments in retirement expectations (2008–2011)
The above results show strong initial responses to the reform on
retirement. Of interest is whether retirement expectations change
in the longer run and, ultimately, whether expectations match
realizations. Starting with expectations in the longer run, we esti-
mate model (1) for 2008 to 2011. It is important to note that our
longer-run analyses focus on respondents who responded at the
Fig. 7. Developments in expected age of retirement. The figures present the (Epanechnikov) kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of the expected retirement age for the
period 2007–2011 (for two successive birth months). The vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control and treatment groups. The confidence intervals are at the 95%
level.
19 The results based on the administrative data (24,381 observations) show an effect
of 0.238 (s.e. = 0.012).
20 A model for actual retirement in 2013 yields, as expected, a substantially smaller
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of the respondents relative to their response about their expecta-
tions in 2002. We therefore do not use the additional response
from the renewed invitation to participate in the Internet survey
in later years.
In March 2011 (when the survey was held), 13.8% of the 1949
cohort and 3.7% of the 1950 cohort had retired. After 2011, these
fractions rose rapidly (notably for the 1949 cohort; we return to
examine actual retirement patterns in the next section). We there-
fore decided not to use the 2012 wave and to restrict ourselves to
retirement expectations in 2008–2011.
Below, we discuss the results for the change in the expected
retirement age, dERit, t = 2007, . . ., 2011. Table C2 in Appendix C
and Fig. 7 reports the result for the retirement expectation levels,
that is, ERit, t = 2007, . . ., 2011. The results of these regressions
are very similar to the results discussed below. This also indicates
that the conditioning on presence in the initial sample (required
for dERit regressions) does not influence our results.
The first column of Table 5 repeats the results of Column (1) of
Table 2, while the other columns show the results for later years.
The most important result is that the longer-run treatment effects
are not much different from the short-run effect. Therefore, it
seems that the readjustments took place shortly after the reform
and the workers stuck to these in later years. The consistency in
treatment effects can most likely be explained by the fact that
we are analyzing the behavior of older workers confronted with
substantial changes in pension wealth only a few years prior to
their initially planned retirement. The situation could be different
for younger cohorts.11We finally also ran regressions for participation in the LCS for
later years. The results of these regressions are presented in
Table C4 of Appendix C and show that the treatment effects on this
outcome variable remain relatively constant over the later years.
While this result is interesting in itself, it also attests to the stabil-
ity of the findings on retirement expectations in Table 5.
4.3.2. Retirement realizations
The survey data are linked to administrative data containing
information on actual retirement up to March 2014, which implies
that those born in the first months of 1949 have turned 65, the
statutory retirement age. Therefore, besides differences in pension
rights and eligibility conditions, the pure age effect will also lead to
substantially higher retirement ages for the controls. Fig. 8 con-
firms this effect. The retirement rates of the 1949 cohort range
from about 70% to more than 90% for those born in the first quarter
of the year. In contrast, the retirement rates of the 1950 cohort are
40–50 percentage points lower. The regression results in Table 6
show, controlling for age, that the pure treatment effect is about
26 percentage points.19
The treated group does not reach the statutory retirement age
by the end of the sample period, while part of the control group
does. We therefore run a regression excluding individuals born in
the first quarter of the year. This change hardly affects the estimate
(0.276, s.e. = 0.034).20 Fig. 9 plots the cumulative retirement ageeffect (0.171, s.e. = 0.023).
Fig. 9. Cumulative retirement by age for the treated and controls. This figure
excludes individuals born in the first quarter of the year.
Fig. 8. Retirement realizations in 2014. The figure presents the (Epanechnikov)
kernel-weighted local polynomial plots of the retirement rates in 2014 (for two
successive birth months). The vertical line marks the threshold dividing the control
and treatment groups. The confidence intervals are at the 95% level.
Table 5
Longer-run effects in retirement expectations.
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ER(t)–ER(2002) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Treatment dummy 0.875*** 0.803*** 0.602*** 0.652*** 0.750***
(0.102) (0.139) (0.146) (0.157) (0.177)
Birth date/100 0.543 0.066 0.421 1.098** 0.705
(0.339) (0.458) (0.467) (0.509) (0.609)
Birth date/100 * 8Treatment dummy 1.166** 0.524 0.467 1.205 0.575
(0.479) (0.651) (0.693) (0.746) (0.864)
Married 0.264*** 0.443*** 0.355** 0.523*** 0.488***
(0.097) (0.142) (0.147) (0.169) (0.183)
Low educated 0.016 0.123 0.007 0.135 0.077
(0.102) (0.140) (0.157) (0.176) (0.245)
High educated 0.204** 0.299*** 0.324** 0.363*** 0.205
(0.086) (0.114) (0.132) (0.139) (0.155)
Wage (ln) 0.387*** 0.242 0.224 0.166 0.385*
(0.124) (0.168) (0.186) (0.195) (0.224)
Number of contribution years to the pension fund 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.023** 0.011
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Constant 4.685*** 3.007* 2.962 2.707 5.682**
(1.323) (1.800) (1.987) (2.092) (2.445)
Observations 6476 3393 3183 2615 2101
Adjusted R2 0.062 0.058 0.051 0.074 0.072
The regressions also control for subsectors. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 6
Retired in 2014: Results from a linear probability model.
Dependent variable: Retired in 2014 (1)
Treatment dummy 0.263***
(0.023)
Birth date/100 0.766***
(0.069)
Birth date/100 * Treatment dummy 0.393***
(0.101)
Constant 0.628***
(0.017)
Observations 6476
Adjusted R2 0.241
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*p < 0.10.
**p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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12distribution for the two cohorts, omitting those born in the first
quarter of the year. At each age, the retirement rates of the controls
are much higher, but also note that the retirement rates of the trea-
ted seem to lag by about one year (at least up until age 63). We
therefore also estimate a Tobit model on the retirement age with
right censoring at age 64. The results of this regression are reported
in Table 7. The treatment coefficient implies an increase in the retire-
ment age of 1.2 years (about 14 months).21 In earlier sections, we
also saw that about 16% of the affected cohort chose to participate
in the LCS and that such workers intended to fully counter the effect
of the reform. Unfortunately, those participating in the LCS were not
considered retired when they took a self-financed leave before the
actual date of retirement. We therefore cannot check this with the
administrative data, but it is conceivable that a fraction of the work-
ers considered in the data as retiring later could, in fact, have
stopped working earlier. The estimate in Table 6 can therefore be21 Omitting individuals born in the first quarter of the year reduces this figure to
1.013 years (s.e. = 0.167).
Table 7
Tobit model on retirement age (right censored at age 64).
(1)
Dependent variable: Retirement age (right censored)
Treatment dummy 1.207***
(0.109)
Birth date/100 0.283
(0.346)
Birth date/100 * Treatment dummy 0.902*
(0.520)
Constant 62.990***
(0.075)
Observations 6702
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
**p < 0.05.
* p < 0.10.
*** p < 0.01.
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where we assume that all LCS participants were retired by March
2014, which reduces the coefficient to 0.218 (s.e. = 0.024). We
can thus set the true effect of being retired in 2014 as bound within
the interval [0.263, 0.218]. Unfortunately, it is not possible to
determine the bounds of the exact age of retirement (see Table 7)
unless one is willing to make strong assumptions.4.4. Additional analyses and sensitivity
Figs. 1a–1c show that PPW accrual rates are higher in the new
system, but also that the PPW of the new and old systems converge
at or just after the statutory retirement age. We therefore examine
whether there is a differential response to the reform between
workers who expected in 2002 to retire prior to age 60 and those
who expected to retire at or after the statutory retirement age
(65). Table C5 in Appendix C shows that those who initially
expected to retire at or after age 65 do not increase their private
savings.
We also examine whether there is a differential treatment effect
across wage, education, and health. We did not find significantly
different treatment effects for expectations and savings. For retire-
ment realizations, we find that higher-educated workers are less
likely to be retired in 2014 than lower-wage workers.
The RDD regressions of the previous section could be subject to
threats concerning the specification and sample selection that
could influence our results. First, we re-estimate all the models
using the optimal bandwidth approach of Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012). Table C6 in Appendix C shows that the
results across all outcome variables are hardly affected. Second,
although graphical evidence indicates no age effects, we also esti-
mate RDD models with quadratic age effects.22 In all but one case,
these regressions do not affect the outcome (the results are shown in
Appendix D).
Third, the reform implied that the treated could not retire
before the age of 60, whereas the controls still could. These
changes in the left tail of the retirement distribution could influ-
ence the treatment effect, as well as its interpretation. To verify
this, we also re-estimate the models for all the outcome variables,
excluding individuals who retired before age 60. Note that this
stratification invalidates a causal interpretation of the results.
The results are reported in Table C7 in Appendix C and show that
this did not significantly alter the effects across all outcome
variables.22 Gelman and Imbens (2018) suggest using second-order polynomials, and not
higher-order polynomials in RD designs.
13Fourth, the sample attrition is substantial. In Appendix B, we
examine the survey participation patterns for the treated and con-
trol groups and show that attrition does not depend on the treat-
ment status. It is, however, still conceivable that especially for
the longer run effects changes in the treatment effects might be
due to changes in the composition of the sample. To further look
into this we re-estimated the models for longer-run expectations
outcomes regressions, using the sample of individuals who were
present in all waves (see Table C3 in Appendix C). While this sub-
stantially reduces the number of observations, this only marginally
changed the treatment effects.
Finally, the pension fund ABP covers the central government,
local government, and privatized (formerly government) sectors,
the latter being primarily utility sectors (energy and electricity)
and railway transportation. The behavior of workers in these sec-
tors could be different from that of other public sector workers.
Indeed, they are slightly overrepresented in the group of treated
participants in the LCS. In Table C8 in Appendix C, we show the
results for these workers. The table shows that the treatment effect
of participation in the LCS is indeed much larger than the effects of
about eight percentage points in our main analyses. However, with
respect to the other outcome variables, we find only marginal
changes.
5. Summary, discussion, and conclusion
This paper looks at the response of retirement expectations,
actual retirement, and savings to a pension reform. The reform
affected workers born in 1950 (or later) and led to a substantial
loss in pension wealth. Those born prior to 1950 (controls) were
not affected and could retire at the age of 62 with a replacement
rate of 70% of the average of wages earned in the past 10 years.
The affected cohort in our sample (treated) had to work 13 months
longer to obtain the same replacement rate or they could retire at
age 62 with a replacement rate of 64%. At the same time, the gov-
ernment launched a tax-facilitated savings program, the LCS, that
permitted tax-free savings of up to 12% of one’s annual earnings.
This program was open to all workers (treated and controls).
We find strong behavioral responses to the reform. The expec-
tation data show that, one year after the reform, affected workers
expected, on average, to work about 10.5 months longer. The drop
in pension wealth is equivalent to a retirement that is 13 months
earlier, so our results suggest that the average treated worker
makes up for the drop in their pension wealth mainly at the
expense of leisure in retirement and, to a lesser extent, by decreas-
ing post-retirement consumption. The difference in retirement
expectations between the treated and control groups remained
stable in later years and is close to the differences in actual retire-
ment rates observed in 2014. So, immediately after the reform the
workers revised their plans and stuck to these in later years. It thus
appears that that the reform was very effective in raising the
retirement age for the larger part of the sample. Our results on
retirement are consistent with earlier studies documenting impor-
tant effects of changes in the incentive structure of Social Security
and pensions on labor supply and earnings (Krueger and Pischke,
1992; Borsch-Supan, 2000; Coile and Gruber, 2007; Mastrobuoni,
2009; Blau and Goodstein, 2010; Gelber, Isen and Song, 2016;
Fetter and Lockwood, 2018)
Participation in the tax-facilitated LCS was around 16% for the
treated, which is more than twice the savings rate of the controls.
The savings response remained stable in later years. Those in the
control and treated cohorts who were participating in the program
stated that they expected to finance an earlier retirement by about
eight months and 13 months, respectively. The controls’ savings of
about eight months could be interpreted as a response to the large
savings subsidy on LCS savings. These are additional savings. This
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effect on total savings when the contribution limits of tax-
facilitated IRAs are increased.
For the treated, the savings effect is the sum of increased private
savings induced by the drop in PPW and additional savings
induced by the savings subsidy. Under some additional assump-
tions we can interpret the five-month difference between the trea-
ted and controls as a savings effect induced by the drop in pension
wealth, that is, a pure crowding-in effect of 38% between public
and private wealth. This result is similar to those of Bottazzi
et al. (2006), who find a 30% substitution rate between public
and private wealth, and in the range of estimates found in other
studies (e.g., Feldstein and Pellechio, 1979; Gale, 1998; Bernheim,
2002; Engelgardt and Kumar, 2011; Chetty et al., 2014; Alessie
et al., 2013).
The 16% of workers born in 1950 who participated in the LCS
stuck to their previously planned retirement dates. These workers
were mostly high-wage workers. For these workers, private wealth
fully crowded out PPW. Those not participating in the LCS expected
to postpone retirement by 12.5 months. These were generally
lower-wage workers who, on average, were also in worse health.
This result suggests that the zero substitution rate between private
and public health is primarily due to financial constraints, rather
than a low disutility of work.
The effects found here could have to do with the reform’s imple-
mentation. The reform was unexpected, implemented shortly after
its announcement, and late in the game for the workers studied
here. At the time of the implementation, in January 2006, the
affected cohort in our sample was 56 years old, leaving them with
six years to save a one-year leave if they desired retiring at age 62
rather than at age 63. It is conceivable that this was not possible for
the larger part of the workers. However, we cannot exclude the
possibility that our findings also hold for younger low-wage work-
ers, despite having a longer period to compensate for the loss in
public pension wealth. Unfortunately, we cannot check this with
the data at hand. We therefore leave this issue for future research.
The question is whether the strong labor supply effects of the
pension reform on low-wage workers, who are often also in worse
health, is desirable from the perspective of a government. A further
unintended side effect of the introduction of the tax-facilitated sav-
ings plan is that, in particular, high-wage earners who participated
in the savings program but who were not affected by the pension
reform decided to retire even sooner than initially planned.
Do our results for older workers in the public sector have exter-
nal validity? The public sector is atypical, in the sense that workers
are, on average, much more educated and face different working
conditions than workers in other sectors of the economy. In sectors
with strenuous working conditions, such as construction, workers’
health can limit the ability to extend their working life. Therefore,
for such workers, the effect of a similar reform on actual retirement
could be smaller. Workers in these sectors are also less educated,
have lower wages, and are likely to have less wealth to compensate
for losses in PPW. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to exam-
ine this issue in more detail for workers in these sectors. We do,
however, find similar treatment effects for workers in privatized
(formerly public) sectors.
Although our findings are not generalizable to all workers, old
and young, they do, however, point to important lessons for other
countries that have implemented or are planning to implement
pension reforms. Demographic changes and retirement patterns
in the past require timely action. This means that reforms will
involve a substantial group of older workers who are facing retire-
ment in the short run. Reforms announced late in the game have
substantial effects on retirement patterns, but most of the effect
is confined to workers who are financially constrained and who
cannot counter PPW losses with private wealth. These are gener-14ally lower-wage workers with lower education levels and generally
worse health. The results are relevant to workers in all countries,
irrespective of the specifics of the country’s pension system.
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